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Abstract
This paper studies a simple class of zero-sum games played by two competing quantum
players: each player sends a mixed quantum state to a referee, who performs a joint measure-
ment on the two states to determine the players’ payoffs. We prove that an equilibrium point of
any such game can be approximated by means of an efficient parallel algorithm, which implies
that one-turn quantum refereed games, wherein the referee is specified by a quantum circuit,
can be simulated in polynomial space.
1 Introduction
The theory of games has been studied extensively in mathematics and in several other disciplines
for which it has applications. In theoretical computer science, computational aspects of game
theory represent an important focus of the field.
There are several settings of interest to quantum computation and quantum cryptography
that are naturally modeled by quantum games, which are games involving the exchange and pro-
cessing of quantum information. For instance, multi-prover quantum interactive proofs [KM03,
CHTW04, KKM+08, KKMV08] can be modeled as cooperative quantum games; quantum coin-
flipping [Amb01, Kit02, SR02, Moc04, Moc07] is naturally modeled as a game between two players
that directly exchange quantum information; and quantum refereed games [Gut05, GW05, GW07]
are competitive games that model quantum interactive proofs with competing provers.
In this paper we consider a simple type of non-interactive, zero-sum quantum game: two
competing players (hereafter called Alice and Bob) each send a mixed quantum state to a referee,
who performs a joint measurement on the two states to determine the players’ payoffs. For a fixed
description of the referee, let φ(ρ, σ) denote Alice’s expected payoff when she sends a mixed state
ρ to the referee and Bob sends a mixed state σ. (For zero-sum games, Bob’s payoff is then given
by −φ(ρ, σ).) The theory of quantum information requires the function φ(ρ, σ) to be bilinear, from
which it follows that
max
ρ
min
σ
φ(ρ, σ) = min
σ
max
ρ
φ(ρ, σ) (1)
from well-known variants of the Min-Max Theorem. (Indeed, such a fact holds for a much more
general class of quantum zero-sum games that can allow for many rounds of interaction among
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the referee and players [GW07].) The value represented by the two sides of the equation (1) is
called the value of the game. An equilibrium point of such a game is a pair of quantum states (ρ, σ)
such that
max
ρ′
φ(ρ′, σ) = φ(ρ, σ) = min
σ′
φ(ρ, σ′),
the existence of which follows from the equation (1). In other words, when one player plays
one of the states of an equilibrium point, the other has no incentive to play a state different from
the other state in the pair. (These notions are, of course, similar to those for classical zero-sum
games, but with some technical differences due to the nature of quantum information. In par-
ticular, there is a continuum of pure strategies for quantum players, corresponding to what are
known as pure quantum states.) An equilibrium point of a zero-sum quantum game, given as
and explicit description of the referee’s measurement, can be efficiently computed by means of
semidefinite programming.
The main result of this paper is an efficient parallel algorithm to find approximate equilibrium
points of non-interactive zero-sum quantum games. For the case where the referee is specified by
a quantum circuit rather than in explicit matrix form, this algorithm implies that the value of such
a game can be approximated in polynomial space. More succinctly, it implies that the complexity
class QRG(1) of problems having one-turn quantum refereed games is contained in PSPACE.
Our algorithm is an example of the multiplicative weights update method, which is discussed
in the papers [AHK05b, TRW05], for instance, and is explained in detail in the PhD thesis of
S. Kale [Kal07]. This general method captures many previously discovered (and sometimes re-
discovered) algorithms, and has origins in learning theory, game theory, and optimization. The
specific formulation of our algorithm is a non-commutative extension of an (unpublished) algo-
rithm of Rohit Khandekar and the first author (Rahul Jain) that approximates equilibrium points
of classical games.
In the sections that follow, we give relevant definitions from the theory of quantum informa-
tion, present the algorithm and its analysis, and discuss the containment QRG(1) ⊆ PSPACE that
follows. We also explain how the problem of finding equilibrium points of quantum games relates
to the problem of approximating positive instances of semidefinite programs.
2 Preliminaries and definitions
This section gives a brief summary of the quantum information-theoretic concepts that are needed
in the paper, and then defines non-interactive zero-sum quantum games. A few additional defini-
tions that will be helpful later in the paper are also discussed.
2.1 Basic quantum information-theoretic notions
In this paper we require just a few basic concepts about quantum information; so it is not neces-
sarily required that the reader has any prior familiarity with it.
When we refer to a quantum register we simply mean a discrete quantum system that we wish
to consider, such as a collection of qubits representing a message transmitted from one party to
another. With any quantum register we associate some vector space X = Cn for a positive integer
n that intuitively represents the maximum number of distinct classical states that could be stored
in the register without error. A state of such a register is represented by a density matrix, which is
a n× n positive semidefinite matrix having trace equal to 1. Density matrices may reasonably be
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viewed as the quantum information-theoretic analogue to a vector of probabilities, representing a
probability distribution. We will write D (X ) to denote the set of all density matrices associated
with a register that is described by X . It is natural to view such density matrices as linear operators
acting on X , and for this reason the term density operator is commonly used in place of density
matrix.
When two registers having associated spaces X = Cn and Y = Cm are considered as a single
compound register, the associated space becomes the tensor product space X ⊗ Y = Cnm. If the
two registers are independently prepared in states described by ρ and σ, respectively, then the
joint state is described by the nm× nm density matrix ρ⊗ σ. This matrix may be written in block
form as
ρ⊗ σ =
ρ1,1σ · · · ρ1,nσ... . . . ...
ρn,1σ · · · ρn,nσ
 .
In general, for a vector space X = Cn, we write L (X ) to denote the set of all n× n complex
matrices, or linear operators mapping X to itself, and we write Herm (X ) to refer to the subset
of L (X ) given by the Hermitian matrices. These are the matrices A satisfying A = A∗, where A∗
denotes the adjoint or conjugate transpose of A. The set Herm (X ) forms a vector space over R, and
many optimization methods designed for real-valued symmetric matrices extend to Herm (X )
with little or no special consideration. Finally, we write Pos (X ) to denote the subset of Herm (X )
that consists of all positive semidefinite n× nmatrices (or operators acting on X ).
The Hilbert-Schmidt inner product on L (X ) is defined as
〈A, B〉 = Tr(A∗B)
for all A, B ∈ L (X ). It holds that 〈A, B〉 is a real number for all choices of Hermitian matrices A
and B, and is a nonnegative real number for all choices of positive semidefinite matrices A and B.
A measurement of a register, having an associated vector space X = Cn, is described by a
collection of n × n positive semidefinite matrices that sum to the identity. Specifically, a mea-
surement that has some finite, non-empty set Σ of possible outcomes is described by a collection
{Pa : a ∈ Σ} ⊂ Pos (X ) satisfying
∑
a∈Σ
Pa = 1X .
Here, 1X denotes the n× n identity matrix, or identity operator onX . (The subscriptX is dropped
when it is implicitly clear.) If the register corresponding to X is in a state described by the density
matrix ρ ∈ D (X ), and this measurement described by {Pa : a ∈ Σ} ⊂ Pos (X ) is performed, each
outcome a ∈ Σ will be observed with probability 〈Pa, ρ〉.
2.2 Non-interactive zero-sum quantum games
In a non-interactive zero-sum quantum game, Alice and Bob each send a quantum state to a ref-
eree, who performs a measurement on these two states to determine their payoffs. Hereafter we
will let A = Cn and B = Cm refer to the vector spaces corresponding to the states that Alice and
Bob send to the referee.
When the referee performs a measurement to determine Alice and Bob’s payoffs, a joint mea-
surement is used. In other words, Alice’s and Bob’s states are together viewed as a single state of
a register. We therefore have that the referee’s measurement is described by a collection
{Ra : a ∈ Σ} ⊂ Pos (A⊗B)
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that satisfies the condition
∑
a∈Σ
Ra = 1A⊗B.
If Alice sends the state ρ and Bob sends the state σ, then each possible measurement outcome
a ∈ Σ appears with probability 〈Ra, ρ⊗ σ〉.
A payoff for each player is associated with each possible measurement outcome a ∈ Σ. As we
consider only zero-sum games, it is sufficient to describe these payoffs by a function v : Σ → R;
with Alice’s payoff for outcome a being v(a) and Bob’s payoff being −v(a). For a given choice of
states ρ and σ, it holds that Alice’s expected payoff is given by
∑
a∈Σ
v(a) 〈Ra, ρ⊗ σ〉 = 〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉
for
R = ∑
a∈Σ
v(a)Ra.
Bob’s expected payoff is given by− 〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉. When one is interested only in the expected payoff
of a given game, it is therefore sufficient to consider that the game is simply determined by R. We
will refer to R as a payoff observable, given that a matrix that arises in this way from a measurement
and a real-valued function on its outcomes is sometimes called an observable.
A necessary and sufficient condition for a matrix R acting on A⊗ B to arise from some mea-
surement and real-valued payoff function v as just described is that R is Hermitian. The sort of
payoff function φ(ρ, σ) discussed in the introduction therefore takes the form φ(ρ, σ) = 〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉
for R ranging over the set of Hermitian matrices of the appropriate size. As the tensor product is
a universal bilinear function, and every real-valued linear function on Herm (A)⊗Herm (B) can
be expressed as an inner product with some Hermitian matrix R, we have that a necessary and
sufficient condition for φ(ρ, σ) to be a physically valid payoff function is that φ is a real-valued
bilinear function.
Now, given that the sets D (A) and D (B) are convex and compact, and that Alice’s expected
payoff 〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉 is a bilinear function on D (A)× D (B), it follows from well-known extensions
of von Neumann’s Min-Max Theorem [vN28] that
max
ρ∈D(A)
min
σ∈D(B)
〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉 = min
σ∈D(B)
max
ρ∈D(A)
〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉 . (2)
(See, for instance, [Fan53].) We define α(R) to be the value of the game determined by R, which
is the quantity represented by the two sides of the above equation (2). A pair of quantum states
(ρ, σ) is called an equilibrium point for R if both ρ and σ independently achieve the maximum and
minimum, respectively, in equation (2); or, equivalently, that
min
σ′∈D(B)
〈
R, ρ⊗ σ′
〉
= 〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉 = max
ρ′∈D(A)
〈
R, ρ′ ⊗ σ
〉
.
Again, the existence of an equilibrium point follows easily from equation (2).
We define that an ǫ-approximate equilibrium point of a game with payoff observable R is a pair
of states (ρ, σ) such that
max
ρ′∈D(A)
〈
R, ρ′ ⊗ σ
〉
− ε ‖R‖ ≤ 〈R, ρ⊗ σ〉 ≤ min
σ′∈D(B)
〈
R, ρ⊗ σ′
〉
+ ε ‖R‖ .
Note that this is an approximation in an additive sense, and is relative to the maximum absolute
value of any payoff (which is reflected by the presence of the factor ‖R‖ in the error).
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2.3 Additional definitions and notation
This section summarizes some additional terminology and notation that will be used in the paper.
First, a linear mapping of the form Φ : L (B) → L (A) is called a super-operator (as it maps linear
operators to linear operators). The adjoint super-operator to Φ has the form Φ∗ : L (A) → L (B),
and is uniquely determined by the condition
〈A,Φ(B)〉 = 〈Φ∗(A), B〉
for all A ∈ L (A) and B ∈ L (B). A super-operator Φ : L (B) → L (A) is said to be positive
if it holds that Φ(P) is positive semidefinite for every choice of a positive semidefinite operator
P ∈ Pos (B). It is the case that Φ∗ is positive if and only if Φ is positive.
There is a one-to-one and onto linear correspondence between the collection of operators of
the form R ∈ L (A⊗B) and the collection of super-operators of the form Φ : L (B) → L (A),
which is sometimes known as the Choi-Jamiołkowski isomorphism. Specifically, for every super-
operatorΦ : L (B) → L (A), one defines an operator R ∈ L (A⊗B), called the Choi-Jamiołkowski
representation of Φ, by the equation
R = ∑
1≤i,j≤m
Φ(Ei,j)⊗ Ei,j ,
where Ei,j is the matrix with a 1 in entry (i, j) and 0 in every other entry. Conversely, given an
operator R ∈ L (A⊗B), one defines a super-operator Φ : L (B) → L (A) by means of the formula
Φ(B) = TrB (R (1A ⊗ B
T)) . (3)
It follows that
Tr (R(A⊗ B)) = Tr (AΦ(BT))
for every choice of A ∈ L (A) and B ∈ L (B). These correspondences are both linear, and are
inverse to one another—so one is free to translate back and forth between the two as necessary for
a given application. The assumption that R is positive semidefinite implies that the corresponding
super-operatorΦ is positive. (In fact, Φ has the stronger property of being completely positive if and
only if R is positive semidefinite.)
For a given quantum game, we may equally well calculate expected payoffs and equilibrium
points by using the unique super-operator Φ determined by (3) rather than the payoff observable
R. In particular, (ρ, σT) is an equilibrium point of the game defining R if and only if
min
σ′∈D(B)
〈
ρ,Φ(σ′)
〉
= 〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 = max
ρ′∈D(A)
〈
ρ′,Φ(σ)
〉
, (4)
and the value of this game is alternately expressed as
α(Φ)
def
= max
ρ∈D(A)
min
σ∈D(B)
〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 = min
σ∈D(B)
max
ρ∈D(A)
〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 . (5)
For a Hermitian n× n matrix A, one denotes the eigenvalues of A by
λ1(A) ≥ λ2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ λn(A),
sorted from largest to smallest and including each eigenvalue a number of times equal to its mul-
tiplicity. For every n× n Hermitian matrix A, the spectral norm is denoted ‖A‖ and satisfies
‖A‖ = max{|λ1(A)| , . . . , |λn(A)|},
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while the trace norm is denoted ‖A‖1 and satisfies
‖A‖1 = |λ1(A)|+ · · ·+ |λn(A)| .
(Note that both of these formulas assume that A is Hermitian.)
Using the above notation, we may express the equations (4) and (5) in simpler terms: (ρ, σT) is
an equilibrium point of the game defining Φ if and only if
λ1(Φ(σ)) = 〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 = λm(Φ
∗(ρ)),
while the value of this game satisfies
α(Φ) = min
σ∈D(B)
λ1(Φ(σ)) = max
ρ∈D(A)
λm(Φ
∗(ρ)).
Finally, for future reference we note that if a payoff observable R satisfies 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, then it
holds that 0 ≤ Φ(σ) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Φ∗(ρ) ≤ 1 for all choices of density matrices ρ ∈ D (A) and
σ ∈ D (B). Moreover, for arbitrary Hermitian matrices A ∈ Herm (A) and B ∈ Herm (B), we
have ‖Φ(B)‖ ≤ ‖B‖1 and ‖Φ
∗(A)‖ ≤ ‖A‖1.
3 The Main Result
We now present the main result of the paper, which is a parallel algorithm to approximate the
value of a non-interactive zero-sum quantum game. This fact is stated as Theorem 1 below, fol-
lowing a few comments on the assumed form of the input.
We suppose that a given non-interactive zero-sum quantum game is described by payoff ob-
servable R ∈ Herm (A⊗B), for A = Cn and B = Cm as discussed in the previous section. More
precisely, we assume that R is given as an nm× nm matrix, along with a specification of the di-
mensions n and m. Each entry of R is a complex number, which we assume has rational real and
imaginary parts, each represented as the ratio of two integers expressed in binary notation. We let
k be the maximum length of the binary representation over all of these integers, and define size(R)
to be (nm)2k. It is clear that O(size(R)) bits suffice to encode R.
In addition to R, n and m, an accuracy parameter ε > 0 is also given as input. For technical
reasons it is most convenient to assume that ε is represented in unary notation: each string 1r, for
a positive integer r, denotes the value ε = 1/r. This assumption on the input form of ε reflects
the fact that our algorithm does not scale well with respect to accuracy—it forces the length of the
input to be proportional to 1/ε rather than log(1/ε), and therefore permits our algorithm to be
described by circuits with size polynomial in the input length.
The output of the algorithm will be a pair of density matrices (ρ, σ) where ρ ∈ D (A) and
σ ∈ D (B). They are assumed to be represented in a manner similar to the input matrix R.
Theorem 1. An ε-approximate equilibrium point (ρ, σ) for a given payoff observable R can be computed by
a logarithmic-space uniform family of Boolean circuits having depth polynomial in log(size(R)) and 1/ε.
3.1 Parallel algorithm for positive games
Our algorithm is most naturally described for the case that the payoff observable R satisfies
0 ≤ R ≤ 1. We therefore begin with this case, which will imply Theorem 1 by an appropriate
translation and rescaling of R. The algorithm is described in Figure 1.
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Algorithm
1. Let µ = ε/8 and let N =
⌈
64 ln(nm)/ε2
⌉
.
2. Initialize: A0 = 1A, ρ0 = A0/Tr(A0), B0 = 1B, and σ0 = B0/Tr(B0).
3. For each j from 1 to N, let Aj, ρj, Bj, and σj be as follows:
Aj = exp
(
µ
j−1
∑
i=0
Φ(σi)
)
,
ρj = Aj/Tr(Aj),
Bj = exp
(
−µ
j−1
∑
i=0
Φ∗(ρi)
)
,
σj = Bj/Tr(Bj).
4. Output the pair (ρ, σT), where
ρ =
1
N
N−1
∑
j=0
ρj and σ =
1
N
N−1
∑
j=0
σj.
Figure 1: A parallel algorithm for obtaining an ε-approximate equilibrium point of a one-round
zero-sum quantum game. The game is assumed to be described by a payoff observable R satisfy-
ing 0 ≤ R ≤ 1, which gives rise to a positive map Φ : L (B) → L (A) as described in Section 2.3.
3.1.1 Accuracy of the algorithm
In this section, the accuracy of the algorithm described in Figure 1 is analyzed. We note that a
similar type of analysis has appeared in previous works on the multiplicative weights update
method and its predecessors, and in particular the reader is referred to [Kal07] for information on
the generality of the approach.
At this point in the analysis we are concerned only with the idealized algorithm described in
Figure 1—numerical issues concerning the required precision with which the idealized operations
are performed are discussed in the next subsection. We begin by noting some facts concerning
matrix exponentials. First, the Golden-Thompson Inequality (see Section IX.3 of [Bha97]) states that,
for any two Hermitian matrices X and Y of equal dimension, we have
Tr
(
eX+Y
)
≤ Tr
(
eXeY
)
.
Second is the following simple pair of inequalities concerning the matrix exponential of positive
and negative semidefinite matrices.
Lemma 2. Let P be an operator satisfying 0 ≤ P ≤ 1. Then for every real number µ > 0, the following
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two inequalities hold:
exp(µP) ≤ 1 + µ exp(µ)P,
exp(−µP) ≤ 1 − µ exp(−µ)P.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the inequalities for P replaced by a scalar λ ∈ [0, 1], for then the op-
erator inequalities follow by considering a spectral decomposition of P. If λ = 0 both inequalities
are immediate, so let us assume λ > 0. By theMean Value Theorem there exists a value λ0 ∈ (0,λ)
such that
exp(µλ)− 1
λ
= µ exp(µλ0) ≤ µ exp(µ),
from which the first inequality follows. Similarly, there exists a value λ0 ∈ (0,λ) such that
exp(−µλ)− 1
λ
= −µ exp(−µλ0) ≤ −µ exp(−µ),
which yields the second inequality.
We now proceed to the main part of the accuracy analysis, which comprises two bounds on
the eigenvalues of Φ∗(ρ) and Φ(σ), where (ρ, σT) is the output of the algorithm.
Lemma 3. The following inequalities hold:
λ1(Φ(σ)) ≤
exp(µ)
N
N
∑
j=1
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉
+
ln(n)
µN
, (6)
λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≥
exp(−µ)
N
N
∑
j=1
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉
−
ln(m)
µN
. (7)
Proof. Let us begin by noting that each of the operators Aj and Bj (for j = 0, . . . ,N) that are
obtained during the course of the algorithm are positive definite, and therefore have positive trace.
It follows that each of the operators ρj and σj is a well-defined density operator.
To prove the first inequality, observe that
AN = exp
(
µ
N
∑
j=1
Φ(σj−1)
)
= exp (µNΦ(σ)) .
Given that AN is positive definite, it holds that
Tr(AN) ≥ λ1(An) = exp(µNλ1(Φ(σ))),
and therefore
λ1(Φ(σ)) ≤
ln(Tr(AN))
µN
. (8)
The inequality (6) will now follow by bounding ln(Tr(XN)), which can be done as follows.
First, note that we may alternately write
Aj = exp
(
ln(Aj−1) + µΦ(σj−1)
)
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for each j ≥ 1, and therefore
Tr(Aj) = Tr
(
exp
(
ln(Aj−1) + µΦ(σj−1)
))
≤ Tr
(
Aj−1 exp
(
µΦ(σj−1)
))
by the Golden-Thompson inequality. As σj−1 is a density operator, it holds that Φ(σj−1) ≤ 1, and
therefore
exp
(
µΦ(σj−1)
)
≤ 1 + µ exp(µ)Φ(σj−1)
by Lemma 2. Thus, using the fact that Tr(XY1) ≤ Tr(XY2) for all choices of matrices X, Y1, and Y2
with X ≥ 0 and Y1 ≤ Y2, we have
Tr(Aj) ≤ Tr
(
Aj−1
(
1 + µ exp(µ)Φ(σj−1)
))
= Tr(Aj−1)
(
1+ µ exp(µ)
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉)
.
It now follows from the inequality 1+ µ ≤ exp(µ) that
Tr(Aj) ≤ Tr(Aj−1) exp
(
µ exp(µ)
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉)
.
Applying this inequality recursively, and using the fact that Tr(A0) = n, we obtain
Tr(AN) ≤ exp
(
µ exp(µ)
N
∑
j=1
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉
+ ln(n)
)
. (9)
Combining (8) and (9) yields
λ1(Φ(σ)) ≤
exp(µ)
N
N
∑
j=1
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉
+
ln(n)
µN
,
as required.
The second inequality follows by similar reasoning, except with a few differences that we now
highlight. We first observe that
BN = exp (−µNΦ
∗(ρ)) .
This time we have
Tr(BN) ≥ λ1(BN) = exp(−µNλm(Φ
∗(ρ))),
where the switch from the largest eigenvalue to the smallest is caused by the minus sign in the
exponential function. Thus,
λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≥ −
ln(Tr(BN))
µN
. (10)
The quantity Tr(BN) is now bounded in the same way as Tr(AN), except that we need the second
inequality in Lemma 2. Specifically, the Golden-Thompson inequality implies
Tr(Bj) = Tr(exp(ln(Bj−1)− µΦ
∗(ρj−1))) ≤ Tr(Bj−1 exp(−µΦ
∗(ρj−1))).
As Φ∗(ρj−1) ≤ 1 we have
exp(−µΦ∗(ρj−1)) ≤ 1 − µ exp(−µ)Φ
∗(ρj−1),
and therefore
Tr(Bj) ≤ Tr(Bj−1) exp(−µ exp(−µ)
〈
σj−1,Φ
∗(ρj−1)
〉
).
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It follows that
Tr(BN) ≤ exp
(
−µ exp(−µ)
N
∑
j=1
〈
σj−1,Φ
∗(ρj−1)
〉
+ ln(m)
)
. (11)
Combining (10) and (11), along with the fact that
〈
σj,Φ
∗(ρj)
〉
=
〈
ρj,Φ(σj)
〉
for every choice of j,
yields
λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≥
exp(−µ)
N
N
∑
j=1
〈
ρj−1,Φ(σj−1)
〉
−
ln(m)
µN
and completes the proof.
It is now possible to verify that the output (ρ, σT) of the algorithm satisfies
max
ρ′∈D(A)
〈
R, ρ′ ⊗ σT
〉
− ε/2 ≤ 〈R, ρ⊗ σT〉 ≤ min
σ′∈D(B)
〈
R, ρ⊗ σ′
〉
+ ε/2,
which is expressed in terms of the mapping Φ as
λ1(Φ(σ)) − ε/2 ≤ 〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 ≤ λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) + ε/2.
It follow from Lemma 3 that
λ1(Φ(σ))− λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≤
exp(µ)− exp(−µ)
N
N
∑
j=1
〈
σj−1,Φ(ρj−1)
〉
+
ln(nm)
µN
,
and given that each of the quantities
〈
σj−1,Φ(ρj−1)
〉
is at most 1, we have
λ1(Φ(σ))− λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≤ 2 sinh(µ) +
ln(nm)
µN
< 3µ+
ln(nm)
µN
≤ ε/2.
Thus, given that λm(Φ∗(ρ)) ≤ 〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 ≤ λ1(Φ(σ)), we have
λ1(Φ(σ))− ε/2 ≤ λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≤ 〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 ≤ λ1(Φ
∗(ρ)) ≤ λm(Φ(σ)) + ε/2 (12)
as claimed.
3.1.2 Numerical precision and complexity of the algorithm
Let us now consider the complexity of the algorithm described in Figure 1. It is the goal of this
section to demonstrate that this algorithm can be implemented, by a logarithmic-space uniform
family of Boolean circuits with depth polynomial in log(size(R)) + 1/ε, with sufficient accuracy
to obtain an ε-approximate equilibrium point for the input payoff observable R. Throughout the
analysis, we (sometimes grossly) overestimate errors for the sake of simpler expressions involving
as few variables as possible.
Each iteration performed in step 3 of the algorithm requires the evaluation of Φ and Φ∗, two
matrix exponential computations, and a constant number of elementary matrix operations (in this
case: addition, scalar multiplication, and computation of the trace). Were it not for the matrix
exponentials, it would be straightforward to perform all of the required operations within the
claimed size and depth bounds using exact computations. Given that the matrix exponentials
will generate irrational numbers, however, we must settle for approximations over the course of
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the algorithm. To guarantee that the algorithm is sufficiently accurate, it will suffice to perform
all computations to within an additive error of (ε/2) exp(−8N2), as is shown below. (We could
afford to take a much smaller error with respect to size(R), but there is no need to do this.)
Let us begin by making a few simple observations about the matrices computed throughout
the course of the algorithm. The matrices σ0, . . . , σN−1 are density matrices, and therefore it holds
that
∥∥Φ(σj)∥∥ ≤ 1 for each choice of j = 0, . . . ,N − 1. Likewise, ∥∥Φ∗(ρj)∥∥ ≤ 1 for each choice of
j = 0, . . . ,N − 1. Consequently, we have
∥∥Aj∥∥ ≤ eN , ∥∥Bj∥∥ ≤ eN ,
1 ≤ Tr(Aj) ≤ e
2N and e−N ≤ Tr(Bj) ≤ e
N
for j = 0, . . . ,N − 1.
Next, let us represent the actual matrices computed during the course of the algorithm by
placing a tilde over the variables representing the idealized values that are expressed in Figure 1.
It will suffice to prove that ‖ρ− ρ˜‖1 ≤ ε/2 and ‖σ− σ˜‖1 ≤ ε/2, for then the inequalities
|λ1(Φ(σ)) − λ1 (Φ (σ˜))| ≤
ε
2
and |λm(Φ
∗(ρ))− λm (Φ
∗ (ρ˜))| ≤
ε
2
hold. Combined with (12), we obtain the required accuracy.
Now, each iteration of step 3 of the algorithm will introduce some error into the calculation
of the final answer. Let us consider the j-th iteration, and assume that a positive real number
δj ∈ (0, 1) is given such that ‖σi − σ˜i‖1 ≤ δj for i = 0, . . . , j− 1. Let us define
Xj = µ
j−1
∑
i=0
Φ(σi) and X˜j = µ
j−1
∑
i=0
Φ (σ˜i) .
Then
∥∥∥Xj − X˜j∥∥∥ ≤ δjN and ∥∥Xj∥∥ ≤ N, and therefore∥∥∥exp(Xj)− exp(X˜j)∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥Xj − X˜j∥∥∥ e‖Xj−X˜j‖e‖Xj‖ < δje3N ,
where the first inequality follows from Corollary 6.2.32 of [HJ91]. By computing the matrix expo-
nential with accuracy δj we therefore have
∥∥∥Aj − A˜j∥∥∥ ≤ δje4N , and thus ∥∥∥Aj − A˜j∥∥∥
1
≤ δje
5N . It
follows that
∥∥ρj − ρ˜j∥∥1 ≤ 1Tr(Aj)
∥∥∥Aj − A˜j∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥ A˜j∥∥∥
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Tr(Aj) − 1Tr(A˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δje8N .
By similar reasoning, if it holds that ‖ρi − ρ˜i‖1 ≤ δj for i = 0, . . . , j− 1, then
∥∥σj − σ˜j∥∥1 ≤ 1Tr(Bj)
∥∥∥Bj − B˜j∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥ B˜j∥∥∥
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Tr(Bj) − 1Tr(B˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δje8N .
We conclude from these bounds that taking δj = (ε/2)e
−8N2 guarantees that ‖ρ− ρ˜‖1 ≤ ε/2 and
‖σ− σ˜‖1 ≤ ε/2.
The required precision for the matrix exponentials is easily obtained by taking sufficiently
many terms in the series eX = 1 +X+X2/2+X3/6+ · · · . (This of course is not the most efficient
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way to compute matrix exponentials, but it suffices to prove the main theorem.) For instance,
taking 9N2 terms guarantees that the required accuracy (ε/2)e−8N
2
is achieved.
At this point, the parallel complexity of the algorithm is easily bounded. Each of the matrices
stored by the algorithm has entries whose real and imaginary parts are represented in binary
notation using O(N2) bits. For each iteration in step 3 of the algorithm, the evaluations of Φ and
Φ∗, as well as the elementary matrix operations, may therefore be performed by standard parallel
algorithms (see, for instance, [Gat93]) by logarithmic-space uniform Boolean circuits (with size
that is necessarily polynomial in size(R) and 1/ε given this uniformity constraint), within depth
that is polynomial in log(size(R)) and 1/ε. The number of iterations performed is N, which results
in total depth polynomial in log(size(R)) and 1/ε.
3.2 Extensions to arbitrary payoff observables
For an arbitrary payoff observable R, the algorithm from the previous section is not guaranteed to
function correctly, as we have used the positivity of the corresponding super-operator Φ several
times during the analysis.
It is straightforward, however, to translate and scale an arbitrary payoff observable in a way
that allows the algorithm to be used. For an arbitrary positive semidefinite payoff observable R,
this is essentially trivial—one simply runs the algorithm on the payoff observable P = R/ ‖R‖.
For a negative semidefinite payoff observable R, one simply exchanges the roles of Alice and Bob
and considers the payoff observable −R (with the spaces A and B swapped).
Let us now consider the general case of a payoff observable R for which λ1(R) > 0 > λnm(R).
Define
P =
R− λnm(R)1
λ1(R)− λnm(R)
.
Then 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, and so the algorithm from the previous section may be used to obtain an ε-
approximation (ρ, σ) for P. The point (ρ, σ) is easily verified to be a δ-approximate equilibrium
point for R, where
δ =
λ1(R)− λnm(R)
‖R‖
ε ≤ 2ε.
4 QRG(1) is contained in PSPACE
Quantum interactive proof systems with two competing provers are naturally represented as
games between two competing players, moderated by a referee. The two players (Alice and Bob)
play the roles of competing provers, while the referee corresponds to the verifier. Quantum refer-
eed games have been studied in [GW05, Gut05, GW07], and represent a quantum analogue to the
classical refereed games model studied in [FK97].
The simplest form of a refereed quantum game has the general form defined in Section 2;
meaning that there is no communication from the referee to the players. The players each send
a quantum state and the referee measures to determine the winner. With this picture in mind,
one defines the complexity class QRG(1) to be the class consisting of all promise problems A =
(Ayes, Ano) for which there exists a polynomial-time uniform family Q = {Qn : n ∈ N} of quan-
tum circuits, where each circuit Qn takes n + 2p(n) input qubits for some polynomial bounded
function p, such that the following properties hold:
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• For every string x ∈ Ayes it holds that
max
ρ
min
σ
Pr[Q(x, ρ, σ) = 1] ≥
2
3
.
• For every string x ∈ Ano it holds that
max
ρ
min
σ
Pr[Q(x, ρ, σ) = 1] ≤
1
3
.
Here, the maximum and minimum are both over all quantum states on p(|x|) qubits, and the
notation Q(x, ρ, σ) = 1 is shorthand for the event that a measurement of some fixed output qubit
of the circuit Q|x | (with respect to the standard basis) yields 1, assuming that the input to the circuit
is the state |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ ⊗ σ. The name QRG(1) refers to the fact that these are quantum refereed
games with 1 turn, during which the players send quantum states to the referee in parallel.
The class QRG(1)may be viewed as a simple variant of QMA, where there are two competing
provers rather than a single prover. It is obvious that QMA ⊆ QRG(1), and that QRG(1) is closed
under complementation (and thus co-QMA ⊆ QRG(1)).
The class QRG(1) may roughly be thought of as a quantum analogue to the class SP2 that was
defined by [Can96] and [RS98], and it is easily observed that SP2 ⊆ QRG(1). There is one subtlety,
however, which is that the definition of QRG(1) does not allow one prover to see the other’s
message (which would not make sense in the quantum setting anyway), whereas the standard
definition of SP2 does.
Proposition 4. QRG(1) ⊆ PSPACE.
Proof. Suppose that A is a promise problem contained in QRG(1), and that {Qn} is a polynomial-
time uniform family of quantum circuits that witnesses this fact. For each input x, let Rx denote
the payoff observable that corresponds to the game played by the players Alice and Bob on input
x, where the payoff for Alice is defined as 1 for acceptance and 0 for rejection. The expected payoff
is therefore the probability of acceptance, which Alice tries to maximize and Bob tries to minimize.
We denote by NC(poly) the class of promise problems computed by polynomial-space uniform
Boolean circuits with polynomial depth. It holds that NC(poly) ⊆ PSPACE [Bor77], so it therefore
suffices to prove that A ∈ NC(poly). This is easily accomplished by composing three families of
Boolean circuits:
1. A family of Boolean circuits that outputs a description of the payoff observable Rx associated
with the game on input x.
2. The family of Boolean circuits given by Theorem 1, that finds an ε-approximate equilibrium
point (ρ, σ) of the payoff observable Rx, for ε = 1/8.
3. A family of Boolean circuits that computes the expected payoff 〈Rx, ρ⊗ σ〉, and accepts if the
value is greater than 1/2 (rejecting otherwise).
The first family is easily derived from the circuits {Qn}, by computing the product of a polyno-
mial number of exponential-size matrices that correspond to the quantum gates of the appropriate
circuit Qn. This family may be taken to be polynomial-space uniform, with polynomial depth. The
second family is, as suggested above, given by Theorem 1. This family is logarithmic-space uni-
form and has polynomial-size and poly-logarithmic depth with respect to size(Rx). Thus, with re-
spect to the input length |x|, this family is polynomial-space uniform, and has polynomial depth.
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The last family is required only to perform elementary matrix and arithmetic operations, and can
be taken to have similar properties as the first two: polynomial-space uniformity and polynomial
depth. Composing these families appropriately demonstrates that A ∈ NC(poly) as required.
5 Parallel Approximation of Positive Semidefinite Programs
We now discuss the connection between equilibrium points of non-interactive zero-sum quantum
games and semidefinite programs. The main focus of this section will, in particular, be on positive
instances of semidefinite programs, and on the question of whether good parallel methods to ap-
proximate them exist. We will first discuss the general notion of positive instances of semidefinite
programs and then explain how our algorithm may be used in their approximation, albeit with
poor accuracy in some cases.
The multiplicative weights update method has been applied to semidefinite programming in
[AHK05a, AK07], and the general connection between equilibrium points of different types of
games and linear/semidefinite programs is well-known. Once again, the reader is referred to
Kale [Kal07] for further details and historical remarks.
5.1 Positive instances of semidefinite programs in super-operator form
Suppose that the following input has been given:
1. a Hermitian matrix A ∈ Cn×n,
2. a Hermitian matrix B ∈ Cm×m, and
3. a linear mapping Φ : Cm×m → Cn×n (i.e., a super-operator) that preserves Hermiticity.
To say that Φ preserves Hermiticity means that Φ(Y) is Hermitian for every choice of a Hermitian
matrix Y ∈ Cm×m. This condition is equivalent to the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation R of Φ
being a Hermitian matrix.
Given this input, let us consider the following semidefinite programming problem, which we
say is in the super-operator form:
Super-operator primal form
maximize: 〈B,Y〉
subject to: Φ(Y) ≤ A,
Y ≥ 0.
Super-operator dual form
minimize: 〈A,X〉
subject to: Φ∗(X) ≥ B,
X ≥ 0.
Here, X and Y range over all (positive semidefinite) matrices in Cn×n and Cm×m, respectively. This
form is completely general: it is possible to translate semidefinite programs in so-called standard
form to the super-operator form, and vice versa. It can be shown that strong duality holds for
semidefinite programs in the super-operator form under conditions that are similar to those for
standard form semidefinite programs. In particular, the existence of either of the following implies
that strong duality holds:
1. a positive definite matrix Y for which Φ(Y) < A, or
2. a positive definite matrix X for which Φ∗(X) > B.
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We define that such a problem instance is positive if A and B are positive semidefinite matrices
and Φ is a positive super-operator. Let us also define that such a problem is strictly positive if it
holds that A and B are positive definite and Φ is a strictly positive super-operator (which means
that Φ(1) is positive definite). Strong duality necessarily holds for all strictly positive semidefinite
programs in the super-operator form.
5.2 Parallel approximation of strictly positive semidefinite programs
Parallel algorithms for approximately solving positive linear programs have been given by Luby
and Nisan [LN93] and Young [You01]. To our knowledge, an analogous problem for semidefinite
programs has not been considered.
The algorithm from Section 3.1 can be used to approximate, in parallel, strictly positive in-
stances of semidefinite programs as we now explain. First, let us note that an arbitrary strictly
positive semidefinite program in the super-operator form can be transformed into one of the fol-
lowing simpler form:
Primal
maximize: Tr(Y)
subject to: Φ(Y) ≤ 1,
Y ≥ 0.
Dual
minimize: Tr(X)
subject to: Φ∗(X) ≥ 1,
X ≥ 0.
This may be done by defining
Φ(Y) = A−
1
2 Ψ
(
B−
1
2YB−
1
2
)
A−
1
2
for a given problem instance defined by A > 0, B > 0, and a strictly positive super-operator Ψ.
Now, to make the connection with the algorithm from the previous section clear, let us recall
that we define A = Cn and B = Cm, and suppose that the super-operator Φ that represents the
above semidefinite program takes the form Φ : L (B) → L (A). Let us also define opt(Φ) to be the
optimal value of the primal problem (which is the same as the optimal value of the dual problem
by strong duality). It is clear that opt(Φ) > 0, for some positive scalar multiple of the identity
must be primal feasible. Let us also recall that we have defined
α(Φ) = max
ρ∈D(A)
min
σ∈D(B)
〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 .
Proposition 5. For all strictly positive super-operators Φ we have α(Φ) = 1/ opt(Φ).
Proof. Let (ρ, σ) be an equilibrium point of Φ, meaning that
λ1(Φ(σ)) = 〈ρ,Φ(σ)〉 = λm(Φ
∗(ρ)) = α(Φ).
The assumption that Φ is strictly positive implies that α(Φ) is positive.
We now observe that σ/α(Φ) is primal feasible, as it is positive semidefinite and satisfies
λ1 (Φ (σ/α(Φ))) = 1,
which implies Φ (σ/α(Φ)) ≤ 1A. Likewise, ρ/α(Φ) is dual feasible as it is positive semidefinite
and satisfies
λm(Φ
∗(ρ/α(Φ))) = 1,
which implies Φ∗(ρ/α(Φ)) ≥ 1B. Both result in the same objective value 1/α(Φ), and so the
proposition follows by (weak) duality.
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It follows that the algorithm from Section 3.1 may be used to approximate opt(Φ), albeit with
limited accuracy for some choices of Φ, by taking the reciprocal of the value of the game associated
with Φ. To be more specific, let R be the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation of the super-operator
Φ as discussed in Section 2.3. Let us write α˜(Φ) to denote the approximate value of the game
described by R that results from the algorithm’s ε-approximate equilibrium point of R, and let us
also write o˜pt(Φ) = 1/α˜(Φ). We then have(
1−
ε ‖R‖
α(Φ)
)
α(Φ) ≤ α˜(Φ) ≤
(
1+
ε ‖R‖
α(Φ)
)
α(Φ)
and therefore (
1+
ε ‖R‖
α(Φ)
)−1
opt(Φ) ≤ o˜pt(Φ) ≤
(
1−
ε ‖R‖
α(Φ)
)−1
opt(Φ).
For choices of Φ for which α(Φ) is large and ‖R‖ is small (bounded below and above by
constants, say), a reasonable approximation to opt(Φ) may be obtained. For many choices of Φ,
however, our method is clearly not suitable, and we believe it is an interesting problem for future
research to find more accurate parallel algorithms for this problem.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that equilibrium points of non-interactive zero-sum quantum games
can be efficiently computed in parallel, using the multiplicative weights update method. As a
consequence, we have that one-turn quantum refereed games can be simulated in polynomial
space, or QRG(1) ⊆ PSPACE. We have also illustrated the connection between values of quantum
games and positive instances of semidefinite programming problems.
The main open question that we wish to raise concerns the existence of efficient parallel algo-
rithms for positive instances of semidefinite programming problems. The class of such problems
for which our algorithm gives accurate solutions is limited. To what extent can this task be per-
formed for more general classes?
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